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Quantum cryptography has attracted much recent attention due to its potential for providing
secret communications that cannot be decrypted by any amount of computational effort. This is the
first analysis of the secrecy of a practical implementation of the BB84 protocol that simultaneously
takes into account and presents the full set of complete analytical expressions for effects due to the
presence of pulses containing multiple photons in the attenuated output of the laser, the finite length
of individual blocks of key material, losses due to error correction, privacy amplification, continuous
authentication, errors in polarization detection, the efficiency of the detectors, and attenuation
processes in the transmission medium. The analysis addresses eavesdropping attacks on individual
photons rather than collective attacks in general. Of particular importance is the first derivation of
the necessary and sufficient amount of privacy amplification compression to ensure secrecy against
the loss of key material which occurs when an eavesdropper makes optimized individual attacks
on pulses containing multiple photons. It is shown that only a fraction of the information in the
multiple photon pulses is actually lost to the eavesdropper.
The use of quantum cryptographic protocols to gen-
erate key material for use in the encryption of classi-
cally transmitted messages has been the subject of in-
tense research activity. The first such protocol, known
as BB84 [1], can be realized by encoding the quantum
bits representing the raw crytpographic key as polariza-
tion states of individual photons. The protocol results in
the generation of a shorter string of key material for use
by two individuals, conventionally designated Alice and
Bob, who wish to communicate using encrypted messages
which cannot be deciphered by a third party, conven-
tionally called Eve. The unconditional secrecy of BB84
has been proved under idealized conditions, namely, on
the assumption of pure single-photon sources and in the
absence of various losses introduced by the equipment
which generates and detects the photons or by the quan-
tum channel itself [2]. The conditions under which se-
crecy can be maintained under more realistic circum-
stances have been studied extensively [3–6]. This is the
first analysis of the secrecy of a practical implementa-
tion of the BB84 protocol that simultaneously takes into
account and presents the full set of complete analytical
expressions for effects due to the presence of pulses con-
taining multiple photons in the attenuated output of the
laser, the finite length of individual blocks of key mate-
rial, losses due to error correction, privacy amplification,
continuous authentication, errors in polarization detec-
tion, the efficiency of the detectors, and attenuation pro-
cesses in the transmission medium [7]. We consider in
this paper attacks made on individual photons, as op-
posed to collective attacks on the full quantum state of
the photon pulses. The extension to other protocols, such
as B92 [8] is straightforward, but is not discussed here
due to limitations of space.
The protocol begins when Alice selects a random string
of m bits from which Bob and she will distill a shorter
key of L bits which they both share and about which
Eve has exponentially small information. We define the
secrecy capacity S as the ratio of the length of the final
key to the length of the original string:
S = L
m
(1)
This quantity is useful for two reasons. First, it can be
used in proving the secrecy of specific practical quantum
cryptographic protocols by establishing that
S > 0 (2)
holds for the protocol. Second, it can be used to establish
the rate of generation of key material according to
R = S
τ
, (3)
where τ is the pulse period of the initial sequence of pho-
ton transmissions. Several scenarios in which useful key
generation rates can be obtained are described in [7].
The length of the final key is given by
L = n− (eT + q + t+ ν)− (a+ gpa) (4)
The first term, n is the length of the sifted string. This
is the string that remains after Alice has sent her qubits
to Bob, and Bob has informed Alice of which qubits were
received and in what measurement basis, and Alice has
indicated to Bob which basis choices correspond to her
own. We consider here the important special case where
the number of photons in the pulses sent by Alice follow a
Poisson distribution with parameter µ. This is an appro-
priate description when the source is a pulsed laser that
has been attenuated to produce weak coherent pulses. In
this case, the length of the sifted string may be expressed
as [7]
n =
m
2
[
ψ≥1 (ηµα) (1− rd) + rd
]
, (5)
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where η is the efficiency of Bob’s detector, α is the trans-
mission probability in the quantum channel, and rd is the
probability of obtaining a dark count in Bob’s detector
during a single pulse period. ψ≥k (X) is the probability
of encountering k or more photons in a pulse selected at
random from a stream of Poisson pulses having a mean
of X photons per pulse:
ψ≥k (X) ≡
∞∑
l=k
ψl (X) =
∞∑
l=k
e−X
X l
l!
, (6)
Other types of photon sources may be treated by appro-
priate modifications of equations 5 and 6. A compre-
hensive treatment of this subject, including an extensive
analysis of factors contributing to α, is found in [7].
The next terms represent information that is either in
error, or that may potentially be leaked to Eve during
the rest of the protocol. This information is removed
from the sifted string by the algorithm used for privacy
amplification, and so the corresponding number of bits
must be subtracted from the length of the sifted string
to obtain the size of the final key that results.
The first such term, eT , represents the errors in the
sifted string. This may be expressed in terms of the pa-
rameters already defined and the intrinsic channel error
probability rc:
eT =
m
2
[
ψ≥1 (ηµα) rc (1− rd) + rd
2
]
, (7)
where the intrinsic channel errors are due to relative mis-
alignment of Alice’s and Bob’s polarization axes and, in
the case of fiber optics, the dispersion characteristics of
the transmission medium. These errors are removed by
an error correction protocol which results in an additional
q bits of information about the key being transmitted
over the classical channel. We express this as
q ≡ Q
(
x,
eT
n
)
eT
=
xh (eT/n)
eT /n
eT (8)
where h(p) is the binary entropy function for a bit whose
a priori probability of being 1 is p. The factor x is intro-
duced as a measure of the ratio by which a particular er-
ror correction protocol exceeds the theoretical minimum
amount of leakage given by Shannon entropy [9]:
qmin = nh (eT /n) =
h (eT /n)
eT /n
eT (9)
The next term, t, is an upper bound for the amount of
information Eve can obtain by direct measurement of the
polarizations of single photon pulses. This upper bound
may be expressed as
t = TeT (10)
where T is given by [7,10,11]
T (n1, eT , eT,1, ǫ) =
(
n1
eT
− eT,1
eT
)
I¯Rmax
(
eT,1
n1
+ ξ (n1, ǫ)
)
+ξ (n1, ǫ)
n1
eT
(
1− eT,1
n1
)1/2
,
(11)
with
I¯Rmax (ζ) ≡ 1 + log2
[
1− 1
2
(
1− 3ζ
1− ζ
)2]
, (12)
and ξ is defined by
ξ (n1, ǫ) ≡ 1√
2n1
erf−1 (1− ǫ) . (13)
In the above equation ǫ is a security parameter that
gives the likelihood for a successful eavesdropping attack
against a single-photon pulse in the stream.
Finally, we have used
n1 =
m
2
[
ψ1 (ηµα) (1− rd) + rd
]
, (14)
and
eT,1 =
m
2
[
rcψ1 (ηµα) (1− rd) + rd
2
]
, (15)
which are the contributions to n and eT from the sub-
set of Alice’s pulses for which exactly one photon reaches
Bob.
The next term, ν, is the information leaked to Eve by
making attacks on pulses containing more than one pho-
ton. There are a variety of possible attacks, including co-
herent attacks that operate collectively on all the photons
in the pulse. We restrict our attention to disjoint attacks
that single out each individual photon. Even with this
restriction, there are a large number of alternatives. Eve
can perform a direct attack by making direct measure-
ments of the polarization of some subset of the photons
and allowing the rest to continue undisturbed. She can
also perform an indirect attack by storing some of the
photons until she learns Alice and Bob’s basis choices
by eavesdropping on their classical channel. She then
measures the stored photons in the correct basis to un-
ambiguously determine the value of the bit. Finally, she
can make a combined attack by using the two strategies
in some combination. In [7] it is shown that the optimum
attack is always either a direct or an indirect attack, de-
pending on the value of a parameter y, which depends
on channel and detector characteristics and the techno-
logical capabilities attributed to Eve [7]. For the case of
a fiber optic channel, it is possible in principle for Eve to
replace the cable with a lossless medium, so that those
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pulses whose polarizations she can measure are guaran-
teed to reach Bob. In this case we take y = η. For the
free space case, such an attack may not be feasible, but
she can achieve a similar effect by using entanglement. In
this version of the indirect attack, Eve and an accomplice
located near Bob prepare pairs of entangled photons in
advance. Eve then entangles one of these pairs with a
photon emitted by Alice. Her accomplice can now make
measurements on the entangled state, gaining informa-
tion about the photons at Eve’s location without losing
photons to the attenuation in the channel. If we allow
for such attacks, we still have y = η. If we do not at-
tribute this level of technology to Eve, it is appropriate
to take y = ηα. Note also that Eve can perform direct
attacks using classical optical equipment, but that the
indirect attacks require the type of apparatus envisaged
for quantum computers.
There are three regions of interest. If y > 1 −
1√
2
(
i.e., y >∼ 0.293
)
, the indirect attack is stronger,
and the maximum information that Eve can obtain is
νmax =
m
2
[[
ψ≥2 (µ)− (1− y)−1
·
{
e−yµ − e−µ
[
1 + µ (1− y)
]}]]
.
(16)
If y < 1 − 13√
2
(
i.e., y <∼ 0.206
)
, the direct attack is
stronger, and Eve’s information is
νmax =
m
2
[
ψ2 (µ) y + 1
−e−µ
(√
2 sinh
µ√
2
+ 2 cosh
µ√
2
− 1
)]
.
(17)
Finally, if y lies between these two regions, the relative
strength of the attacks depends on the number of photons
in the pulse. The information leaked to Eve is
νmax =
m
2
[[
ψ2 (µ) y + e
−µ
(
sinhµ−
√
2 sinh
µ√
2
)
+
∞∑
k=2
ψ2k (µ)
{
θ
(
σe (k, y)− 1
)[
1− (1− y)2k−1
]
+
[
1− θ
(
σe (k, y)− 1
)] (
1− 21−k)
}]]
,
(18)
where we have introduced the function:
σe (k, y) =
1− (1− y)2k−1
1− 21−k , (19)
For a photon pulse with 2k photons, σe (k, y) is greater
than 1 if the indirect attack is stronger and less than 1
if the direct attack is stronger. For odd numbers of pho-
tons, the direct attack is always stronger in this region
[7].
The significance of these results for Eve is evident. If
the key distribution system is operating in the region of
large y, her optimal attack is always the indirect attack.
If the system operates in the region of small y, the direct
attack is optimal. If the system operates in the middle
region, Eve optimizes her attack by measuring nonde-
structively the number of photons in the incoming pulses
and then selecting the attack for each pulse according to
the number of photons it contains.
The expressions for ν represent upper bounds on the
information that is leaked to Eve by attacks on the indi-
vidual photons of multi-photon pulses. In [7] it is shown
that Eve can always choose an eavesdropping strategy
to achieve this upper bound as long as Bob does not
counterattack by monitoring the statistics of multiple de-
tection events that occur at his device. Even with this
proviso, the upper bounds are only a fraction of the in-
formation contained in the multi-photon pulses. This
indicates that the assumption, common in the literature,
that Alice and Bob must surrender all of this information
to Eve is overly restrictive.
The next two terms are grouped together at the end of
the expression because their effect on S vanishes in the
limit of large m. The first of these, a, is the continuous
authentication cost. This is the number of secret bits
that are sacrificed as part of the authentication protocol
to ensure that the classical transmissions for sifting and
error correction do occur between Alice and Bob without
any “man-in-the-middle” spoofing by Eve. For the au-
thentication protocols described in [7], the authentication
cost is
a (n,m) = 4
{
gauth + log2 log2
[
2n (1 + log
2
m)
]}
· log
2
[
2n (1 + log
2
m)
]
+4
[
gauth + log2 log2 (2n)
]
log
2
(2n)
+4 (gEC + log2 log2 n) log2 n
+4 (gauth + log2 log2 gEC) log2 gEC
+g˜EC
+4 (gauth + log2 log2 g˜EC) log2 g˜EC . (20)
The security parameters gauth, gEC , and g˜EC are ad-
justed to limit the probability that some phase of the
authentication fails to produce the desired result. For in-
stance the probability that Eve can successfully replace
Alice’s transmissions to Bob with her own transmissions
is bounded by 2−gauth . The probability that Alice’s and
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Bob’s copies of the key do not match after completion of
the protocol is bounded by 2−gEC + 2−g˜EC .
The last term, gpa, is a security parameter that char-
acterizes the effectiveness of privacy amplification. It is
the number of bits that must be sacrificed to limit the av-
erage amount of information, 〈I〉, about Alice and Bob’s
shared key that Eve can obtain to an exponentially small
number of bits [12]:
〈I〉 ≤ 2
−gpa
ln 2
. (21)
The fundamental expression for the secrecy capacity
may now be written in the limit of small dark count,
rd << 1:
S = 1
2
[
ψ≥1 (ηµα) · (1− frc) +
(
1− f
2
)
rd − ν˜
]
−gpa + a
m
, (22)
where we have defined
f ≡ 1 +Q+ T , (23)
and
ν˜ ≡ 2νmax/m , (24)
so that the rescaled quantity ν˜ is independent of m.
Note that the pulse intensity parameter µ can be cho-
sen to maximize the secrecy capacity S and thus also
the key generation rate R. A detailed investigation of
the optimum pulse intensity under various conditions of
practical interest and the resulting secrecy capacities and
rates may be found in [7].
We have presented results for the secrecy capacity of a
practical quantum key distribution scheme using attenu-
ated laser pulses to carry the quantum information and
encoding the raw key material using photon polarizations
according to the BB84 protocol. This is the first anal-
ysis of the secrecy of a practical implementation of the
BB84 protocol that simultaneously takes into account
and presents the full set of complete analytical expres-
sions for effects due to the presence of pulses containing
multiple photons in the attenuated output of the laser,
the finite length of individual blocks of key material,
losses due to error correction, privacy amplification, con-
tinuous authentication, errors in polarization detection,
the efficiency of the detectors, and attenuation processes
in the transmission medium for the implemantation of
BB84 described in [7]. The transmission medium may be
either free space or fiber optic cable. The results apply
when eavesdropping is restricted to attacks on individ-
ual photons. The extension of these results to include
collective attacks on multiple photon states in full gener-
ality is the subject of continuing research. Of particular
importance are the findings that only a portion of the
information in the multi-photon pulses need be lost to
Eve and the identification of those regions of operation
for which Eve’s attack is optimized by choosing direct
attacks, indirect attacks, or selecting the attack in real
time based on the number of photons in the pulse. The
assumption, common in the literature, that Alice and
Bob must surrender all of this information to Eve is
overly conservative. A companion paper, [13], compares
quantitatively the results described here for attenuated
laser sources with what it is achievable using ideal single-
photon sources.
APPENDIX: NOTE ON THE SECRECY CA-
PACITY FOR KEYS OF FINITE LENGTH
Most of the terms appearing in eq.(4) for the length
of the secret key, L, are directly proportional to the
length of the block of raw key material, m. After di-
viding through by m (cf eq.(1)), the contributions of
these terms to the secrecy capacity S are independent
of m. Three of the terms in L are not proportional to m,
namely gpa, a, and t. They result in contributions to the
effective secrecy capacity that retain explicit dependence
on m.
The third contribution, t, requires additional explana-
tion. Its m dependence arises from a precise application
of the privacy amplification result, eq.(21), derived by
Bennett et al. in [12]. The bound on Eve’s knowledge of
the final key is obtained by assuming she has obtained
a specific amount of Renyi information prior to privacy
amplification. Starting from this point, Slutsky et al. [10]
explicitly introduce a security parameter ǫ (see eq.(13))
to bound the probability that Eve has obtained more
than t bits of Renyi information as a result of her attacks
on single photon pulses.
By contrast, the analysis of [3] introduces no parame-
ter analogous to ǫ. Furthermore, the expression for the
amount of privacy amplification compression given in [3]
is linear in the blocksize, thus resulting in a contribution
to the secrecy capacity that is independent of the block-
size. While this approach, as developed in [3], does yield
a bound on Eve’s information about the key shared by
Alice and Bob after privacy amplification, explicit results
pertaining to the amount of information Eve obtains on
the key prior to privacy amplification are not presented.
Such results have important practical consequences. For
example, Eve’s likelihood of obtaining more than a given
fraction of the raw key from her attacks on single pho-
tons increases as the block size of the key material is re-
duced. One therefore expects that the amount of privacy
amplification compression required to ensure secrecy will
increase as well. However, since this conclusion is strictly
a consequence of the information Eve obtains prior to pri-
vacy amplification, it cannot be inferred from the analysis
of [3]. In contrast, the approach of [10], which we adopt
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in our analysis, relates the privacy amplification compres-
sion directly to the amount of information leaked to Eve
prior to privacy amplification. This makes it possible
to analyze the effect of the block size on the amount of
privacy amplification compression, and concomitantly in-
troduces an explicit security parameter, ǫ, as a bound on
Eve’s chances of mounting a successful attack on strings
of finite length.
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